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DIS~RICT BOND CO. V. POLLACK.

[19 C. (2d)

Jan. 1942.]

[19

the original title is, of course, sufficient, and apparently the
phrase "relating to civil liability and financial responsibility
of owners and operators of vehicles" in the title to the amendment refers only to the added sections, and not to the amended
sections. [3] An amending title. is sufficient if it. reads:
, 'An act to amend" a certain section of the code or a statute.
(Estate of Elliott, 165 Cal. 339 [132 Pac. 439] ; Beach v. Von
Detten, 139 Cal. 462 [73 Pac. 187] ; People v. Parvin, 74 Cal.
549 [16 Pac. 490.) [2b] Even assuming that the additional
words relate to section 402, we are satisfied that the phrase
, 'financial responsibility of owners" is sufficiently broad in
meaning to include damage to a person's own property.
The addition of further descriptive words cannot vitiate a
sufficient title, unless such further words indicate a subJect
not really related to the matters covered by the body of a bill.
(Estate of Elliott, supra.)
The trial court properly concluded that under section 402
of the Vehicle Code the negligence of a borrower of a car
should be imputed to the owner in an action by the owner
against a third party.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, J., Carter, J.,
and Traynor, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 17217. In Bank. Jan. 26, 1942.J

DISTRICT BOND COMPANY (a Corporation), Plaintiff,
v. FLORENCE POLLACK et al., Defendants; MARCUS ZASLAW, Intervener and Respondent; E. W.
JOHNSON, Appellant.
[1] Streets-Improvement Act of 1911-Actions-Foreclosure-

E:ffect on Owner Not aParty.-Under the Street Improvement
Act of 1911 (Stats. 1911, p. 730; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937,
Act 8199) a purchaser of property who is bound by an assessment represented by a sewer bond is not divested of his title
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Street,s, § 415 (1); [3] Quieting
. Title, § 48.
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by a foreclosure proceeding or the commissioner's deed, where
he was not made a party to the action and had no notice thereof. The purchaser at the sale obtained the lien which continued to exist against the property.
[2] Id.-Improvement Act of 1911-Actions-Foreclosure-Purchaser's Rights-Subrogation to Tax Liens.-The purchaser at
a sale to foreclose a sewer bond under the Street Improvement Act of 1911 who pays the taxes on the prope,rty, not as a
volunteer but to protect his interest therein is subrogated t()
the tax liens and is properly adjudged to have a lien against
the property for the full amount of his expenditures.
[8] Quieting Title-Conditions to Relief-Payment of Taxes.-A
person who seeks a decree quieting title against another who
paid taxes assessed against the property, not as a volunteer,
but to protect his interest therein, may be required as a condition to relief to repay the amounts expended for such purpose.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Thomas C. Gould, JUdge. Affirmed.
Action to foreclose a street improvement bond in which
the holder of a commissioner's deed issued pursuant to a
prior proceeding to foreclose a sewer bond intervened, seek.
ing a decree quieting his title against the defendant in inter.
vention, a purchaser in possession of the land affected, who
was not a party to the prior proceeding. Judgment quieting
the title of the defendant in intervention, conditioned on payment of amounts expended in payment of the sewer bond and
taxes, affirmed.
R. L. Carlisle for Appell'ant.
Paul Magasin and Charles H. Heustis for Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J.-In 1935, appellant, defendant in interven.
tion in the court below, purchased certain real property
located in Burbank, California, and went into immediate pos.
session. In 1936 an action was brought to foreclose a sewell
bond outstanding against the property. Appellant was not
made a party to this action and had no actual or constructive
[2] See16 Cal. Jur; 349-351; 33 Am. Jur. 439 •
[3] Se,e 22 Cal. Jur. 138.
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notice thereof. A judgment of foreclosure was entered, pursuant to which a sale was held. The property was purchased
at the foreclosure sale by Eva Zaik, and a commissioner's
certificate of sale was issued to her. Eva Zaik assigned this
certificate of sale to respondent, plaintiff in intervention in
the court below, who secured a commissioner's deed to the
property. Respondent paid Eva Zaik the amount bid at the
foreclosure sale, paid delinquent taxes on the property, and
costs. In the following year he paid the current taxes on the
property. The various expenditures amounted to $656.81.
In 1937 the District Bond Company filed an action to foreclose a street improvement bond outstanding against the
property. Respondent obtained leave to file a complaint in
intervention, wherein he claimed to be the owner of the
property by virtue of the deed obtained pursuant to the prior
foreclosure proceeding, offered to pay the Bond Company's
lien, and asked that his title be quieted as against appellant,
who was named as defendant in intervention. Respondent's
ownership of the property was denied by appellant, who
asked in his answer that title be quieted in his favor against
respondent.
The trial court found that the sewer bond foreclosure proceeding was ineffective as to appellant because he had no
notice thereof. It decreed that title to the property should
be quieted in appellant's favor and that appellant pay to
resp()udent the $656.81 expended by respondent in payment
of tJ-..c sewer bond and the taxes against the property on condition that respondent deed all his interest in the property
to appellant, respondent to have a lien against the property
for this amount.
Appellant appeals from that part of the judgment ordering the payment to respondent of the sums expended by him
and providing for a lien against the property.
[1] The assessment represented by the sewer bond created
a lien against the property binding upon all subsequent owners until the bond was paid. (Street Improvement Act of
1911, secs. 66, 75; 63; Stats. 1911, page 730; 2 Deering'S
Gcneral Laws, 1937, Act 8199, secs. 66, 75, 63.) Appellant
therefore acquired the property in question subject to the
assessment lien already existing against it. The proceeding
to foreclose this lien could not operate to divest appellant
of his ownership because he was not made a party to the proceeding and received no notice thereof. (Lee v. Silva, 197
Cal. 364 [240 Pac. 1015] ; Page v. W. W. Ohase 00., 145 Cal.
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578 [79 Pac. 278] ; Noble v. Blanchard, 120 Cal. App. 664
[8 Pac. (2d) 523].) ,The commissioner's certificate of sale
and the commissioner's deed issued to respondent by virtue
of the foreclosure sale were ineffective to pass to respondent
full title to the property. Respondent, however, by his purchase obtained the lien, which continued to exist against the
property. (Burns v. Hiatt, 149 Cal. 617, 620 [87 Pac. 196,
117 Am. St. Rep. 157] ; Tutt v. Van Voast, 36 Cal. App. (2d)
282 [97 Pac. (2d) 869]; Warden v. Barnes, 111 Cal. App.
287, 292 [295 Pac. 569] ; Chapman v. Rudolph, 58 Cal. App.
233 [208 Pac. 370]; Street Improvement Act of 1911, sec.
75, 2 Deering's General Laws, 1937, Act 8199, sec. 75.) The
transaction amounted to a transfer to him of the assessment
lien for value, and in no way prejudiced the rights of appellant who continued to own the property subject to the lien.
(Ibid.)
[2] Respondent, acting not as a volunteer, but to protect
his interest in the property, paid the taxes, past and current,
and was thereby subrogated to the tax liens against the property. (See cases cited in 16 Cal. Jur. 349-351, secs. 48, 49.)
The trial court therefore properly adjudged respondent to
have a lien against the property for the full amount of his
expenditures.
[3] Appellant contends that the relief afforded respondent was outside the issues raised by the pleadings. Appellant, however, in his answer affirmatively requested tho trial
court to quiet title to the property in his favor. (Islais etc.
Water 00. v. Allen, 132 Cal. 432 [64 Pac. 713] ; HouiJh v.
Wright, 127 Cal. App. 689 [16 Pac. (2d) 301]; Brooks v.
White, 22 Cal. App. 719 [136 Pac. 500] ; Bec;k v. Wilson, 49
CaL App. 281 [193 Pac. 158] ; Green v. Palmer, 68 Cal. App.
393 [229 Pac. 876].) A party who requests equitable relief
must satisfy the equitable claims interposed by the opposing
party. (Lanktree v. Lanktree, 6 Cal. (2d) 120 [56 Pac. (2d)
943]; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal. App. 400, 406 [277 Pac.
163] .) The trial court could not quiet appellant's title to the
property without protecting the interests of respondent
therein. (EUis v. Witmer, 134 Cal. 249, 253 [66 Pac. 301] ;
Holland v. Hotchkiss, 162 Cal. 366 [123 Pac. 258, L. R. A.
1915c, 492]; Warden v. Barnes, supraj Jeffords v. Young,
supraj Sawyer v. Berkeley Securities Co., 99 Cal. App. 545
[279 Pac. 217] ; Beck v. Wilson, 49 Cal. App. 281 [193 Pac.
158] ; Colkins v. Doolittle, 45 Cal. App. 776, 780 [188 Pac.
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601] ; Corda.no v. Kelsey, 28 Cal. App. 9, 22-24 [151 Pac. 391,
398] ; Stege v. Richmond, 194 Cal. 305, 319 [228 Pac. 461],
writ of error dismissed, 273 U. S. 648 [47 Sup. Ct. 245, 71
L. Ed. 821] ; Marysville Woolen Mills v. Smith, 178 Cal. 786,
792 [175 Pac. 13]; Hurt v. Pico. Investment Co., 127 Cal.
App. 106, 113 [15 Pac. (2d) 203].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser,
J., and Carter, J., concurred.

[Sac. No. 5497.

In Bank.

Jan. 26, 1942.]

BERT SPARKS, Respondent, v. PAUL ANKER BERNTSEN et al., Appellants.
[Sac. No. 5498.

In Bank.

Jan. 26, 1942.]

JAMES L. JOHNSON, a Minor, etc., Respondent, v. PAUL
ANKER BERNTSEN et al., Appellants.
[Sac. No. 5499.

In Bank.

Jan. 26, 1942.]

BERNARD A. COKER, a Minor, etc., Respondent, v. PAUL
ANKER BERNTSEN et al., Appellants.
[1] Automobiles-Operation-Persons Liable-Lender-Nature of
Liability.-Under Veh. Code, § 402, relating to the liability of
private owners of automobiles operated by others, the owner
is primarily and directly liable jointly with the driver, and
the owner's liability is the same as the driver's unless the verdict or judgment is in excess of the prescribed amount.

[IJ Statutes making owner liable for injury or damage by another operating automobile, notes, 61 A. L. R. 846, 851, 855, 859,
866; 62 A. L. R. 1163. See, also, 2 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 484;
5 Am. Jur. 697.
Liability of owner for negligence of one to whom car is loaned,
notes, 36 A. L. R. 1137; 68 A. L. R. 1008 ;100 A. L. R. 920.
McK. Dig. References: [IJ Automobiles, § 167 (3); [2, 3] Automobiles, § 358; [4, 5] Trial, § 227.
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[2&, 2b] Id.-Actions-Findings, etc.-Verdict-Against Lender
and Operator.-In an action for damages brought against the
owner and the operator of a borrowed automobile,a verdict
for the plaintiff and against the defendants for an amount in
excess of the amount specified in Veh. Code, § 402, is proper
and sufficient. ·Any further provision purporting to apportion
the total damages· as between the defendants is mere ~'mrplus~
age, since the limitation of liability of the owner follows as a
matter of law, and cannot be changed by the jury. In such
eases, it is proper for the court, where the award exceeds th~
amount specified in the code section to render judgment fo1'
the plaintiff in the total amount limiting the recovery against
the owner to the statutory sum, or, where the verdict is for a
less amount, to render judgments against both defendants in
the sum specified in the verdict.
[3] Id.-Actions-Findings, etc.-Verdict - Against Lender and
Operator-Apportioning Damages.~In an action against an
owner and the operator of a borrowed automobile, a verdict
assessing damages at a specified amount against the driver
and a less amount against the owner is erroneous. (See Veh.
Code, § 402.)
[4] Trial-Verdict-Amendment ·by Jury-After Polling the Jury.
-Code Civ. Proc., §§ 618, 619, should be read together. The
polling of the jury does not preclude the court from exercising its powers under § 619 to correct an incorrect or insufficient verdict. The trial court retains control over such proceedings with power to procure correction of an informal or
insufficient verdict until the verdict is recorded and the jury
finally discharged.
[5] Id.-Verdict-Amendment by Jury-Duty ofCourt.-Where
a verdict returned is incorrect or insufficient, it is the duty of
the trial court on objection of a party to refer the verdict
back to the jury.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Placer
County. Raymond McIntosh, Judge assigned. Affirmed.
Consolidated actions for damages arising out of an automo. bile accident brought against both the owner and the operator,
Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.
Hoge, Pelton & Gunther and Butler, Van Dyke & Harris for
Appellants.
Nathan Goldwater, Leo Murcell, Orrin J. Lowell, Lowell &
Lowell,Henry & Bedeau and Grover W. Bedeau for Respondents.

